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000 -CABECERA | |
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campo de control de longitud fija | 07981nam a2200505 i 4500 |
001 - NÚMERO DE CONTROL | |
campo de control | 000713786 |
003 - IDENTIFICADOR DEL NÚMERO DE CONTROL | |
campo de control | OCoLC |
005 - FECHA Y HORA DE LA ÚLTIMA TRANSACCIÓN | |
campo de control | 20240105153430.0 |
008 - DATOS DE LONGITUD FIJA--INFORMACIÓN GENERAL | |
campo de control de longitud fija | 181025s2017 nyua rb 001 0 eng d |
010 ## - NÚMERO DE CONTROL DE LA BIBLIOTECA DEL CONGRESO | |
Número de control de LC | 2016042678 |
020 ## - NÚMERO INTERNACIONAL ESTÁNDAR DEL LIBRO | |
Número Internacional Estándar del Libro | 9780190463984 |
020 ## - NÚMERO INTERNACIONAL ESTÁNDAR DEL LIBRO | |
Número Internacional Estándar del Libro | 0190463988 |
020 ## - NÚMERO INTERNACIONAL ESTÁNDAR DEL LIBRO | |
Número Internacional Estándar del Libro | 9780190463977 |
020 ## - NÚMERO INTERNACIONAL ESTÁNDAR DEL LIBRO | |
Número Internacional Estándar del Libro | 019046397X |
020 ## - NÚMERO INTERNACIONAL ESTÁNDAR DEL LIBRO | |
Número Internacional Estándar del Libro | 9780190463991 |
020 ## - NÚMERO INTERNACIONAL ESTÁNDAR DEL LIBRO | |
Número Internacional Estándar del Libro | 0190463996 |
035 ## - NÚMERO DE CONTROL DEL SISTEMA | |
Número de control de sistema | 429497 |
040 ## - FUENTE DE LA CATALOGACIÓN | |
Centro catalogador/agencia de origen | DLC |
Lengua de catalogación | spa |
Normas de descripción | rda |
Centro/agencia transcriptor | DLC |
Centro/agencia modificador | UIASF |
050 #4 - SIGNATURA TOPOGRÁFICA DE LA BIBLIOTECA DEL CONGRESO | |
Número de clasificación | JF 1081 |
Número de documento/Ítem | F57.2017 |
100 1# - ENTRADA PRINCIPAL--NOMBRE DE PERSONA | |
Nombre de persona | Fisman, Raymond |
Término indicativo de función/relación | autor |
245 10 - TÍTULO | |
Título | Corruption : |
Sub-título | what everyone needs to know / |
Mención de responsabilidad, etc. | Ray Fisman, Miriam A. Golden. |
264 #1 - PRODUCCIÓN, PUBLICACIÓN, DISTRIBUCIÓN, FABRICACIÓN Y COPYRIGHT | |
Producción, publicación, distribución, fabricación y copyright | New York : |
Nombre del de productor, editor, distribuidor, fabricante | Oxford University Press, |
Fecha de producción, publicación, distribución, fabricación o copyright | 2017 |
300 ## - DESCRIPCIÓN FÍSICA | |
Extensión | xviii, 316 páginas : |
Otras características físicas | ilustraciones ; |
Dimensiones | 22 cm. |
336 ## - TIPO DE CONTENIDO | |
Término de tipo de contenido | texto |
Código de tipo de contenido | txt |
Fuente | rdacontent |
337 ## - TIPO DE MEDIO | |
Nombre/término del tipo de medio | sin mediación |
Código del tipo de medio | n |
Fuente | rdamedia |
338 ## - TIPO DE SOPORTE | |
Nombre/término del tipo de soporte | volumen |
Código del tipo de soporte | nc |
Fuente | rdacarrier |
490 1# - MENCIÓN DE SERIE | |
Mención de serie | What everyone needs to know |
504 ## - NOTA DE BIBLIOGRAFÍA, ETC. | |
Nota de bibliografía, etc. | Incluye referencias bibliográficas e índice. |
505 0# - NOTA DE CONTENIDO CON FORMATO | |
Nota de contenido con formato | Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction -- 1.1. What is the purpose of this book? -- 1.2. Why does corruption matter? -- 1.3. What is our framework for understanding corruption? -- 1.4. How can a corrupt country shift to a low-corruption equilibrium? -- 1.5. What are other frameworks for thinking about corruption? -- 1.6. What will you read in the chapters to come? -- 1.7. What did we learn in chapter 1? -- 2. What Is Corruption? -- 2.1. How do we define corruption? -- 2.2. Is corruption necessarily illegal? -- 2.3. How do we measure corruption? -- 2.4. How is political corruption different from bureaucratic corruption? -- 2.5. How is corruption different from corporate malfeasance? -- 2.6. Is influence peddling a form of corruption? -- 2.7. Do clientelism and patronage involve corruption? -- 2.8. Does electoral fraud Involve corruption? -- 2.9. What did we learn In chapter 2? -- 3. Where Is Corruption Most Prevalent? -- 3.1. Why is corruption more common in poor countries? |
505 0# - NOTA DE CONTENIDO CON FORMATO | |
Nota de contenido con formato | Note continued: 3.2. Why do some low-corruption countries remain poor? -- 3.3. How does corruption decline as countries get richer? -- 3.4. Why have some rich countries failed to stamp out corruption? -- 3.5. Is there less corruption than there was twenty years ago -- or more? -- 3.6. Do government scandals mean that corruption is getting worse? -- Case Study: The Peruvian Vladivideos -- 3.7. Are anticorruption campaigns smoke screens for political vendettas? -- 3.8. Have developed countries merely legalized corruption with money in politics? -- 3.9. Why aren't there just two levels of corruption in the world -- high and low? -- 3.10. What did we learn in chapter 3? -- 4. What Are the Consequences of Corruption? -- 4.1. Does corruption reduce economic growth? -- 4.2. How does corruption affect the regulation of business (and vice versa)? -- 4.3. How does corruption affect worker welfare? -- 4.4. What are the consequences of corruption in public construction? |
505 0# - NOTA DE CONTENIDO CON FORMATO | |
Nota de contenido con formato | Note continued: 4.5. Does corruption increase economic Inequality? -- 4.6. Does corruption reduce trust in government? -- 4.7. Are some types of corruption more damaging than others? Part I: Centralized versus decentralized corruption -- Case Study: Extortion in San Pedro Sula -- 4.8. Are some types of corruption more damaging than others? Part II: Uncertainty -- 4.9. Are some types of corruption more damaging than others? Part III: Holding up businesses via corruption -- 4.10. How do natural resources affect corruption -- and how does corruption affect the environment? -- 4.11. Does corruption have any benefits? -- 4.12. What did we learn in chapter 4? -- 5. Who Is Involved in Corruption, and Why? -- 5.1. Why do civil servants take bribes? -- 5.2. Why do politicians extort bribes? -- Case Study: Profiting from political office in India -- 5.3. How do we incorporate morality into our model of bribe giving and taking? -- 5.4. How do politicians foster corruption among bureaucrats? |
505 0# - NOTA DE CONTENIDO CON FORMATO | |
Nota de contenido con formato | Note continued: 5.5. Why do individual companies pay bribes? -- Case Study: The value of political connections in Indonesia and in the United States -- 5.6. Why don't companies band together to refuse to pay bribes? -- 5.7. What do ordinary people think about corruption? -- 5.8. If they don't like corruption, why do individual citizens pay bribes? -- 5.9. What did we learn in chapter 5? -- 6. What Are the Cultural Bases of Corruption? -- 6.1. What is meant by a culture of corruption? -- 6.2. Can we change individual attitudes toward corruption? -- 6.3. How do cultures of corruption propagate themselves? -- 6.4. Is corruption more common in "gift-giving" cultures? -- 6.5. Is corruption more prevalent among members of some religious groups than others? -- 6.6. Are some ethnic groups predisposed to corruption? -- 6.7. What did we learn in chapter 6? -- 7. How Do Political Institutions Affect Corruption? -- 7.1. Are democratic political regimes less corrupt than autocracies? |
505 0# - NOTA DE CONTENIDO CON FORMATO | |
Nota de contenido con formato | Note continued: 7.2. Are all types of autocracies equally corrupt? -- 7.3. Do elections reduce corruption? -- 7.4. Does partisan competition reduce corruption? -- 7.5. Does single-party government perpetuate corruption? -- 7.6. Are some democratic systems of government better for reducing corruption? -- 7.7. Does political decentralization reduce corruption? -- 7.8. Do term limits limit corruption -- or encourage It? -- 7.9. Do campaign finance regulations reduce corruption -- or encourage it? -- 7.10. What did we leam in chapter 7? -- 8. How Do Countries Shift from High to Low Corruption? -- 8.1. Why do voters reelect corrupt politicians? -- 8.2. Does lack of information lead voters to reelect corrupt politicians? -- 8.3. Why do voters need to coordinate to get rid of corrupt officials? -- Case Study: How Italian voters threw out a corrupt political class -- 8.4. How do external forces trigger the fight against corruption? -- 8.5. How can political leadership reduce corruption? |
505 0# - NOTA DE CONTENIDO CON FORMATO | |
Nota de contenido con formato | Note continued: 8.6. What did we learn in chapter 8? -- 9. What Can Be Done to Reduce Corruption? -- 9.1. What government policies reduce corruption? -- 9.2. Does gradual reform work as well as a "big bang" approach? -- 9.3. What tools are most effective in combating corruption? -- 9.4. How does norm change occur? -- 9.5. Can political corruption ever be entirely eradicated? -- 9.6. What did we learn in chapter 9? -- NOTES -- ch. 1 Introduction -- ch. 2 What Is Corruption? -- ch. 3 Where Is Corruption Most Prevalent? -- ch. 4 What Are the Consequences of Corruption? -- ch. 5 Who Is Involved in Corruption, and Why? -- ch. 6 What Are the Cultural Bases of Corruption? -- ch. 7 How Do Political Institutions Affect Corruption? -- ch. 8 How Do Countries Shift from High to Low Corruption? -- ch. 9 What Can Be Done to Reduce Corruption? |
520 ## - SUMARIO, ETC. | |
Sumario, etc. | Corruption regularly makes front page headlines: public officials embezzling government monies, selling public offices, and trading bribes for favors to private companies generate public indignation and calls for reform. In Corruption: What Everyone Needs to Know(R), renowned scholars Ray Fisman and Miriam A. Golden provide a deeper understanding of why corruption is so damaging politically, socially, and economically. Among the key questions examined are: is corruption the result of perverse economic incentives? Does it stem from differences in culture and tolerance for illicit acts of government officials? Why don't voters throw corrupt politicians out of office? Vivid examples from a wide range of countries and situations shed light on the causes of corruption, and how it can be combated. |
650 #0 - PUNTO DE ACCESO ADICIONAL DE MATERIA--TÉRMINO DE MATERIA | |
Término de materia o nombre geográfico como elemento de entrada | Political corruption. |
650 #4 - PUNTO DE ACCESO ADICIONAL DE MATERIA--TÉRMINO DE MATERIA | |
Término de materia o nombre geográfico como elemento de entrada | Corrupción política |
700 1# - PUNTO DE ACCESO ADICIONAL--NOMBRE DE PERSONA | |
Nombre de persona | Golden, Miriam A. |
Término indicativo de función/relación | autor |
830 #0 - PUNTO DE ACCESO ADICIONAL DE SERIE-TÍTULO UNIFORME | |
Título uniforme | What everyone needs to know. |
905 ## - ELEMENTOS DE DATOS E LOCAL, LDE (RLIN) | |
a | 01 |
942 #1 - ELEMENTOS DE PUNTO DE ACCESO ADICIONAL (KOHA) | |
Tipo de ítem Koha | Libros |
980 ## - EQUIVALENCIA O REFERENCIA-CRUZADA-MENCIÓN DE SERIE--NOMBRE DE PERSONA/TÍTULO [LOCAL, CANADÁ] | |
Enlace entre campo y número de secuencia | 51 |
Información miscelánea | Ronald RUIZ |
Ocultar copia en el Opac | Estado de pérdida | Estado dañado | No para préstamo | Código de colección | Localización permanente | Ubicación/localización actual | Ubicación en estantería | Fecha de adquisición | Total de préstamos | Renovaciones totales | Signatura topográfica completa | Código de barras | Fecha visto por última vez | Número de copia | Precio válido a partir de | Tipo de ítem Koha |
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Acervo General | Biblioteca Francisco Xavier Clavigero | Biblioteca Francisco Xavier Clavigero | Acervo | 2021-10-14 | 15 | JF 1081 F57.2017 | UIA179044 | 2023-11-09 | ej. 1 | 2020-08-30 | Libros |