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| 000 -CABECERA | |
|---|---|
| campo de control de longitud fija | 04791nam a2200349 i 4500 |
| 001 - NÚMERO DE CONTROL | |
| campo de control | 000716236 |
| 005 - FECHA Y HORA DE LA ÚLTIMA TRANSACCIÓN | |
| campo de control | 20240105153501.0 |
| 008 - DATOS DE LONGITUD FIJA--INFORMACIÓN GENERAL | |
| campo de control de longitud fija | 190218s2014 nyua rb 001 0 eng d |
| 010 ## - NÚMERO DE CONTROL DE LA BIBLIOTECA DEL CONGRESO | |
| Número de control de LC | 2014006491 |
| 020 ## - NÚMERO INTERNACIONAL ESTÁNDAR DEL LIBRO | |
| Número Internacional Estándar del Libro | 9780199371624 |
| 035 ## - NÚMERO DE CONTROL DEL SISTEMA | |
| Número de control de sistema | 430651 |
| 040 ## - FUENTE DE LA CATALOGACIÓN | |
| Centro catalogador/agencia de origen | DLC |
| Lengua de catalogación | spa |
| Normas de descripción | rda |
| Centro/agencia transcriptor | DLC |
| Centro/agencia modificador | UIASF |
| 050 #4 - SIGNATURA TOPOGRÁFICA DE LA BIBLIOTECA DEL CONGRESO | |
| Número de clasificación | BJ 1461 |
| Número de documento/Ítem | M453.2014 |
| 100 1# - ENTRADA PRINCIPAL--NOMBRE DE PERSONA | |
| Nombre de persona | Mele, Alfred R., |
| Fechas asociadas al nombre | 1951- |
| Término indicativo de función/relación | autor |
| 245 10 - TÍTULO | |
| Título | Free : |
| Sub-título | why science hasn't disproved free will / |
| Mención de responsabilidad, etc. | Alfred R. Mele. |
| 264 #1 - PRODUCCIÓN, PUBLICACIÓN, DISTRIBUCIÓN, FABRICACIÓN Y COPYRIGHT | |
| Producción, publicación, distribución, fabricación y copyright | New York : |
| Nombre del de productor, editor, distribuidor, fabricante | Oxford University Press, |
| Fecha de producción, publicación, distribución, fabricación o copyright | 2014. |
| 300 ## - DESCRIPCIÓN FÍSICA | |
| Extensión | x, 99 páginas : |
| Otras características físicas | ilustraciones ; |
| Dimensiones | 19 cm |
| 336 ## - TIPO DE CONTENIDO | |
| Término de tipo de contenido | texto |
| Código de tipo de contenido | txt |
| Fuente | rdacontent |
| 337 ## - TIPO DE MEDIO | |
| Nombre/término del tipo de medio | sin mediación |
| Código del tipo de medio | n |
| Fuente | rdamedia |
| 338 ## - TIPO DE SOPORTE | |
| Nombre/término del tipo de soporte | volumen |
| Código del tipo de soporte | nc |
| Fuente | rdacarrier |
| 504 ## - NOTA DE BIBLIOGRAFÍA, ETC. | |
| Nota de bibliografía, etc. | Incluye referencias bibliográficas e índice. |
| 520 ## - SUMARIO, ETC. | |
| Sumario, etc. | "Does free will exist? The question has fueled heated debates spanning from philosophy to psychology and religion. The answer has major implications, and the stakes are high. To put it in the simple terms that have come to dominate these debates, if we are free to make our own decisions, we are accountable for what we do, and if we aren't free, we're off the hook. There are neuroscientists who claim that our decisions are made unconsciously and are therefore outside of our control and social psychologists who argue that myriad imperceptible factors influence even our minor decisions to the extent that there is no room for free will. According to philosopher Alfred R. Mele, what they point to as hard and fast evidence that free will cannot exist actually leaves much room for doubt. If we look more closely at the major experiments that free will deniers cite, we can see large gaps where the light of possibility shines through. In Free: Why Science Hasn't Disproved Free Will, Mele lays out his opponents' experiments simply and clearly, and proceeds to debunk their supposed findings, one by one, explaining how the experiments don't provide the solid evidence for which they have been touted. There is powerful evidence that conscious decisions play an important role in our lives, and knowledge about situational influences can allow people to respond to those influences rationally rather than with blind obedience. Mele also explores the meaning and ramifications of free will. What, exactly, does it mean to have free will -- is it a state of our soul, or an undefinable openness to alternative decisions? Is it something natural and practical that is closely tied to moral responsibility? Since evidence suggests that denying the existence of free will actually encourages bad behavior, we have a duty to give it a fair chance"-- |
| Fuente proveedora | Provided by publisher. |
| 520 ## - SUMARIO, ETC. | |
| Sumario, etc. | "Scientists have forged a penetrating, coherent course in the study of human thought and action. Yet some of the same scientists have slashed out an adjacent, rough-hewn path, cutting at the roots of the belief in free will and at the groundwork of relationships among the conscious will, the mind, and the brain. Claiming to disprove the existence of free will is not only wrongheaded, Mele argues, but harmful; research shows that people who don't believe they are free are more likely to behave badly, as they sink into feeling like they aren't responsible for their actions. Putting a positive spin on this, Mele conveys what he calls the 'good news' that we are freer than we think. If we see ourselves as morally responsible for our future actions, we can begin to view ourselves as having abilities and capacities that give us considerable control over what we do. Mele takes apart the findings of neuroscience and psychology experiments often cited as irrefutably disproving the existence of free will, for example those of Benjamin Libet, and demonstrates that their results have been misinterpreted. Mele explains why the experimental findings are actually consistent with our making many of our decisions consciously and with our having considerable control over many of our decisions and actions. In order to find truth and clarity on this crucial topic, Mele argues, philosophers, scientists, and psychologists alike need to explore one another's work rather than relying on scientific findings - and a rigid interpretation of those findings- as the only key to solving the complex puzzle that is free will"-- |
| Fuente proveedora | Provided by publisher. |
| 505 8# - NOTA DE CONTENIDO CON FORMATO | |
| Nota de contenido con formato | Machine generated contents note: -- Preface -- 1. Decisions, Decisions -- 2. Benjamin Libet: If Not Now, When? -- 3. Is Free Will Adrift in New-Wave Neuroscience? -- 4. Good Intentions -- 5. Tough Situations -- 6. Free Will, Fruit Flies, and Evidence -- References. |
| 650 #0 - PUNTO DE ACCESO ADICIONAL DE MATERIA--TÉRMINO DE MATERIA | |
| Término de materia o nombre geográfico como elemento de entrada | Free will and determinism. |
| 650 #4 - PUNTO DE ACCESO ADICIONAL DE MATERIA--TÉRMINO DE MATERIA | |
| Término de materia o nombre geográfico como elemento de entrada | Libre albedrío y determinismo |
| 905 ## - ELEMENTOS DE DATOS E LOCAL, LDE (RLIN) | |
| a | 01 |
| 942 #1 - ELEMENTOS DE PUNTO DE ACCESO ADICIONAL (KOHA) | |
| Tipo de ítem Koha | Libros |
| 980 ## - EQUIVALENCIA O REFERENCIA-CRUZADA-MENCIÓN DE SERIE--NOMBRE DE PERSONA/TÍTULO [LOCAL, CANADÁ] | |
| Enlace entre campo y número de secuencia | 51 |
| Información miscelánea | Ronald RUIZ |
| Ocultar copia en el Opac | Estado de pérdida | Estado dañado | No para préstamo | Código de colección | Localización permanente | Ubicación/localización actual | Ubicación en estantería | Fecha de adquisición | Total de préstamos | Signatura topográfica completa | Código de barras | Fecha visto por última vez | Fecha del último préstamo | Número de copia | Precio válido a partir de | Tipo de ítem Koha |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Acervo General | Biblioteca Francisco Xavier Clavigero | Biblioteca Francisco Xavier Clavigero | Acervo | 2023-04-27 | 1 | BJ 1461 M453.2014 | UIA191475 | 2023-05-09 | 2023-04-27 | ej. 1 | 2020-08-30 | Libros |
