Incluye referencias bibliográficas (páginas [333] -370) e índice.

What is the philosophy of psychology? What counts as psychology? ; Historical background ; Psychological concepts and the philosophy of psychology ; Philosophy of psychology and philosophy of mind -- Levels of psychological explanation and the interface problem. Explanation at different levels ; Personal and subpersonal levels of explanation ; Horizontal explanation, vertical explanation and commonsense psychology ; The interface problem and four pictures of the mind -- The nature of commonsense psychology : the autonomous mind and the functional mind. The autonomous mind and commonsense psychology ; The autonomous mind and the interface problem ; The functional mind ; Philosophical functionalism and psychological functionalism ; Psychological functionalism and the interface problem -- Causes in the mind : from the functional mind to the representational mind. Causation by content : problems with the functional mind ; The representational mind and the language of thought ; The mind ascomputer -- Neural networks and the neurocomputational mind. Top-down explanation vs the co-evolutionary research strategy ; Cognition, co-evolution and the brain ; Neural network models ; Neural network modelling and the co-evolutionary research paradigm : the example of language -- Rationality, mental causation and commonsense psychology. Real patterns without real causes ; How anomalous is the mental? ; The counterfactual approach ; Overview -- The scope of commonsense psychology. Thinking about the scope of commonsense psychology ; Implicit and explicit commonsense psychology : the broad construal ; Modest revisionism : the simulationist proposal ; Narrowing the scope of commonsense psychology (1) ; Narrowing the scope of commonsense psychology (2) ; A suggestion? -- From perception to action : the standard view and its critics. From perception to action : the standard view ; Cognitive architecture and the standard view ; The distinction between perception and cognition ; Domain-specific reasoning and the massive modularity hypothesis -- Propositional attitudes : contents and vehicles. Another look at the interface problem ; The argument for structure ; The problem of structure in artificial neural networks ; Rejecting the structure requirement ; Finding structure in artificial neural networks ; Overview -- Thinking and language. Thinking in words (1) : the inner speech hypothesis ; Thinking in words (2) : the rewiring hypothesis ; The state of play ; Practical reasoning and the language of thought ; Perceptual integration ; Concept learning -- Concluding thoughts : toward a fifth picture.