000			04107cam a2200409 i 4500
001			000721342
003			MX-MxUI
005			20241015091506.0
007			ta
008			241014t20182018enka rb 001 0 eng d
020			_a9781107115828
020			_a1107115825
020			_a9781107535954
020			_a1107535956
035			_a456610
040			_aMX-MxUI _bspa _erda _cMX-MxUI _dMX-MxUI
049			_aUIAA
050		4	_aJC 495 _bG43.2018
100	1		_aGeddes, Barbara _eautor _4aut _0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n93055911 _9206080
245	1	0	_aHow dictatorships work : _bpower, personalization, and collapse / _cBarbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, Erica Frantz
264		1	_aCambridge, United Kingdom ; _aNew York, NY : _bCambridge University Press, _c[2018]
264		4	_c©2018
300			_axvi, 257 páginas ; _c23 cm
336			_atexto _btxt _2rdacontent _0http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/contentTypes/txt
337			_asin mediación _bn _2rdamedia _0http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/mediaTypes/n
338			_avolumen _bnc _2rdacarrier _0http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/carriers/nc
504			_aIncluye referencias bibliográficas e índice.
505	0		_aIntroduction : Implementing our definition of regime ; The groups that initiate dictatorships ; Conflict and bargaining within the seizure group ; Appendix: Coding rules for authoritarian regimes -- Part I. Initiation : Autocratic seizures of power : Who do dictatorial seizure groups oust? ; How dictatorships begin ; Before the seizure of power ; The morning after a seizure of power ; Post-seizure organization -- What do we know about coups? : Coups for various purposes ; Preconditions associated with regime-change coups ; Inequality and coups -- Part II. Elite consolidation : Power concentration: the effect of elite factionalism on personalization : Elite bargaining in dictatorships ; Handing power to a leader ; Bargaining over the distribution of resources and power ; Characteristics that influence the credibility of threats to oust the dictator ; Measuring personalism ; Patterns of Personalism ; The effect of factionalism on the personalization of power -- Dictatorial survival strategies in challenging conditions: factionalized armed supporters and party creation ; The strategic context ; The interaction of dispersed arms and factionalism ; The strategic creation of new political actors ; Evidence that post-seizure party creation aims to counterbalance factionalized armed supporters ; Post-seizure party creation and dictatorial survival ; The effect of post-seizure party creation on the likelihood of coups -- Part III. Ruling society: implementation and information gathering : Why parties and elections in dictatorships? : implementation, monitoring, and information gathering ; Elite competition and institutions that engage citizens ; Parties ; Dictatorial legislatures ; Elections -- Double-edged swords: specialized institutions for monitoring and coercion : Internal security agencies ; The army: bulwark of the regime or incubator of plots? ; The relationship between counterbalancing and interference -- Part IV. Dictatorial survival and breakdown : Why dictatorships fall : How dictatorships end ; Individual support and opposition ; The effect of crisis on decisions to oppose the dictatorship ; Economic crisis and breakdown ; Power concentration and regime survival ; Leadership changes and regime breakdown ; The dictator's future and the likelihood of democratization ; The effect of personalization on prospects for democracy -- Conclusion and policy implications.
650		0	_aDictatorship _0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh92001903
650		4	_aDictadura _9149
650		0	_aDictators _0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85037695
650		4	_aDictadores _9206082
700	1		_aWright, Joseph _q(Joseph George), _d1976- _eautor _4aut _0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2010124665 _9206083
700	1		_aFrantz, Erica _eautor _4aut _0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2010039125 _9206085
942			_cNEWBFXC1 _2lcc
980			_8128854 _gVICTOR DE LA MORA MEDINA
999			_c721342 _d721342